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Introduction
One of the major issues in the discussion of structural unemployment problems in many OECD countries has been the problems of making work pay in low paid jobs compared to being in an income compensating program inside or outside the labour market. In many countries, a high replacement rate in the unemployment insurance or social assistance system for low-skilled workers, sometimes in combination with relatively high income taxes already from a fairly low level of income, has created serious problems of 'unemployment and poverty traps', see OECD (1996, 1999a,b) . If the disposable income as unemployed or non-participant is higher than or close to the disposable income in a potential job, the incentives to search for jobs are reduced and the economic incentives to quit a low-paid job and become voluntarily unemployed for a shorter or longer period are high.
The dis-incentive problems for low skilled workers and the possible existence of unemployment traps may be part of the explanation of high structural unemployment levels in many OECD countries. Thus, efforts have been made during the most recent years to alleviate some of the problems related to the lack of incentives to hold or to search for a low-paid job. A potential solution to the incentive problem is simply to reduce replacement rates in the benefit system. However, since this solution has obvious effects on the income distribution increasing inequality, at least major reductions in the replacement rates have been ruled out as politically unacceptable in many countries. As an alternative, in-work benefits have been introduced in some OECDcountries 1 . This may either be in form of an earned income tax credit (EITC) as for instance in the U.S.A. or through benefits which only employed persons are entitled to. In principle, in-work benefits increase the incentives to search for a job because the net income as employed goes up relative to being non-employed, but without reducing the absolute level of disposable incomes for non-employed as it is the case with reductions in the replacements ratios in the benefit system.
Discussions and analyses in this area often tend to emphasize the eventual negative effects of unemployment insurance and other income compensating programs. Atkinson (1987) has rightly warned against superficial arguments in this area. Later research has also stressed the positive aspects of having an unemployment insurance system. For instance Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that a moderate amount of unemployment insurance may increase economic efficiency because the unemployment insurance system induces risk averse workers to get better job matches than without an unemployment insurance system. On the other hand, Pissarides (1998) shows in a general equilibrium model that a combined change of the tax and benefit structure which increases the incentives to work may reduce unemployment. A comprehensive general survey of recent research in unemployment insurance can be found in Holmlund (1998) .
In this paper, we present empirical evidence concerning the magnitude and the importance of disincentives for low paid workers in Denmark. Denmark has no formal in-work benefit systems, but in spite of that there has been a lot of discussion on these issues since Denmark is one of the OECD countries with the largest labour supply dis-incentives for low paid workers as demonstrated by OECD (1996) 2 . The present study is based on a panel sample survey which is merged with administrative registers. The database used allows us to construct very precise individual budget constraints, including information on fixed costs of work, and further it is possible to combine this information with extensive information on labour supply, and on individual attitudes towards work. The individuals are observed over a period of three years and thus, the database allow us to test whether low-paid workers during this 3-years-period seem to react on economic dis-incentives with respect to search effort, labour supply, retirement, other transitions out of the labour force, and geographical mobility.
The results show that there are large dis-incentives effects for some groups in the Danish labour market. In 1996, 6 per cent of the male workers and 13 per cent of the female workers in the labour force had a lower disposable income if working in a full-time job compared to being on unemployment benefits, i.e their net compensation rate exceeded 100 per cent. Despite this, the majority of the group was actually in a job at the time of the interview in 1996. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that economic dis-incentives do seem to matter. In general, men seem to be more sensitive to economic incentives than women. Economic incentives significantly influence the probability of being unemployed during the year, and a number of measures of search intensity and labour market flexibity. Women with small or negative economic incentives in 1993 have a significantly larger probability of leaving the labour market and enter a public income support scheme or become a housewife. 3 In order to alleviate these dis-incentive problems, the Danish income tax system was changed in 1998 in a small 'tax-reform', where the marginal tax rate on income in the range just exceeding the maximum unemployment benefits was reduced, thus increasing the disposable income if getting a full time job instead of being on maximum unemployment benefits. However, the effect of this reform is fairly limited with respect to disincentive effects for low-paid workers.
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The core of the paper concentrates on economic and demographic variables, We include, however, also a number of job attitude related variables. The results from including the attitude variables into the analyses are reported in Section 7.
Tax and benefit schemes in Denmark
Despite in-work benefit systems do not exist, Denmark as mentioned above is one of the countries in the OECD-area with the largest dis-incentive problems for low-paid workers 3 .
According to OECD (1996) , more than half of the employed workers in Denmark had effective replacement rates in the range from 81 to 100 per cent. Only Sweden had a higher percentage of the employed in this range of replacement rates. The dis-incentives stem from both high taxes on low-incomes and a fairly high gross replacement rate in the benefit schemes for low-paid workers. Further, fixed costs of work, mainly commuting costs and child care costs, are often of a considerable size. In Table 1 , the main features of the Danish income tax scheme in 1996 are illustrated. Table 1 does not include the contributions to social insurance since these are for all practical purposes virtually non-existing in Denmark where financing is coming from general tax revenues. The personal income tax system is a piece wise linear, progressive tax system. Taxes 4 Different types of costs relating to holding a job are allowed to be deducted from the concept of personal income. The costs of work which are accepted to be deducted are transportation costs exceeding a lower limit, membership of unemployment insurance fund and union membership, and a few other types of costs of work. Child care expenditures are not deductible, but prices in day care facilities and in kindergartens are heavily subsidized. 5 Since 1996 the rules have been different for young people aged less than 25 years. After half a year of unemployment, the UI-benefits are cut to about 50 per cent of the UI benefits during the first 6 months. 6 Beside the UI system, there is the social welfare system ('kontanthjaelpssystem') which in principle implies a 100 per cent tax rate on earnings for those who are eligible to social welfare. We do not have information on individuals on social welfare in the sample used in this study, and thus, we do not include social welfare in the analysis. 4 are collected both by the state and two local levels (counties and municipalities). Beside this, there is a proportional tax on all earnings called the gross tax ('bruttoskat'). 4 The top marginal tax rate was 66 per cent in 1996, while the marginal tax rates for all individuals in the low wage group is about 50 per cent.
The benefit system in Denmark consists of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits and social welfare. Unemployment benefits amounts to 90 per cent of previous individual earnings up to a maximum considerably below the average annual earnings for an unskilled worker . It is voluntary to be member of a UI-fund, but since UI-funds are highly subsidized by the state, there is a very high coverage of UI for low-skilled workers with high risks of being unemployed. On average, 80 per cent of the Danish labour force are members of UI funds. In order to be entitled to UI benefits, the unemployed must have been employed for 1 year during the latest 30 months.
The maximum duration of UI was 5 years in 1996 (it has been shortened to 4 years in the late 1990s), but after 2 years (1 year since 1999) the unemployed will get a job offer which he or she has to accept to remain eligible in the UI system.
In 1996, the maximum UI benefits were about DKK 136,000 annually, which were not subject to the 7% gross tax rate, i.e. the marginal tax rate on UI-benefits were about 41% while the average earnings in a full time job on the minimum wage was about DKK 185,000 taxed at the margin with 52 per cent. Thus, for most individuals, the average as well as the marginal increase in disposable income from holding a full time job at the minimum wage compared to being on UI-benefits is fairly limited 6 . The conditions for receiving UI benefits as well as social welfare, is that the person is available 7 If the person receives social welfare but is not able to work due to health or social factors, he does not have to be available for the labour market in order to receive social welfare.
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for the labour market and is an active job searcher 7 . The availability rules and the administration of these rules have been strengthened considerably since the early 1990s. In an international setting, the Danish UI-benefit rules are now characterized as relatively tight, see the description of availability and eligibility rules etc. of the UI-schemes in a number of OECD countries in Grubb (2000) . However, during the time period 1993-1996 studied in this paper, the rules were relatively liberal, and even though the unemployment level during that period was declining it was still high, especially for unskilled workers, so that availability conditions were rather difficult to test in practice.
Theoretical considerations
The theoretical underpinning of the empirical analyses of the incentive effects of unemployment benefits, income taxes, fixed costs of work etc. can either be found in labour supply theory or in search theory. Earlier Danish studies have analysed the impact from work incentives in a labour supply context, see for instance Graversen and Smith (1998) who, based on the same data as used in the present study, analyse the labour supply behaviour and the effects of progressive taxes and means-tested transfers in a 'Hausman-labour-supply' model. In this paper we want to focus on the potential incentives effects on search behaviour, unemployment and exit from the labour market. Thus, we are not primarily interested in the effects of incentives on weekly working hours etc. Instead we focus on the effects on search behaviour for employed as well as unemployed workers, and the incentives effects on observed unemployment experience. The supply aspect enters only in a "negative" sense, i.e. we analyse also the relationship between incentives and the propensity to leave the labour force.
The key variable analysed is the net compensation rate from holding a job relative to collecting UI benefits. Traditionally, in search theory, the compensation rate is defined as the 'raw' gross compensation rate in the UI system, which in the case of Denmark is 90 per cent of previous earnings up to a flat rate as described in the previous section. However, the existence of progressive income taxes and means-tested social transfers, and (fixed) costs of work, imply that the total net compensation rate will often be different from (mostly higher than) the UIcompensation rate. We expand on earlier theoretical and empirical work by including these different components and thus calculate an individual 'total net compensation rate'. We denote this total net compensation rate by δ. δ is defined as the ratio between disposable income if being unemployed and working h = 0 hours, compared to the disposable income if working the standard number of full time hours, h*.
The disposable income when holding a job of h hours weekly is denoted D(h), where D(h) is net income after taxes, including social income transfers when working h hours weekly. If the individual does not work, the disposable income is given by D(0). For simplicity, we ignore that there may be more individuals in the household who contribute to the household disposable income. In the empirical model analysed below these effects are included for the spouse if the person lives in a couple household. Thus, δ, is given by Non-wage income may include the wage and capital income of other household members (spouse). The Danish income tax scheme is based mainly on separate taxation among spouses but some categories of non-wage income are taxed jointly among spouses and the zero-rated allowance may be transferred to the spouse, see Dex et al. (1999) . Thus, there is some interdependency among household members via the budget constraint besides possible cross substitution effects between spouses' leisure time in the utility function. However, contrary to many other countries, unemployment benefits depend only on individual wage income, and not on family income. In the empirical analyses presented below, we are able to take into account household effects in the budget constraint since we have full information on all spouses if the person concerned is living in a couple, whether legally married or not.
Based on the definition given above, a person is classified as being in an unemployment trap if the compensation rate δ 1, i.e. if the individual would have a higher net disposable income as full time unemployed compared to being in a full-time job. Since our measure of δ is based on fairly comprehensive information on each individual, the definition differs from the more summary measures which have usually been used by for instance OECD, see OECD (1996,1999b) . The individual size of δ is expected to influence the actual or future labour market behaviour of both employed and unemployed persons. In order to analyse the effects of δ, we estimate a number of partial models of search, mobility and unemployment experience and test whether δ significantly influences observed behaviour of the individuals.
In the basic search theory, see for instance Mortensen (1977) , it is found that in a model with fixed duration of UI-payments, sequential search, and a stochastic duration of an employment spell, an unemployed worker will increase his reservation wage if UI benefits are increased.
Thus, for an individual who is observed to be unemployed during the survey week, we expect the net compensation rate, δ, to have a positive effect on the reservation rate and a negative effect on search effort and the willingness to move to another region or other aspects of geographical mobility because the utility from getting a job compared to being unemployed on UI-benefits is lower the higher the compensation rate 8 . Likewise, we expect the net compensation rate to have a positive effect on the transition probability to states outside the labour market, eventually with entitlement to an early retirement or leave programme income.
For an employed individual who engage in on-the-job search, the opposite effect on search and potential mobility is expected: The higher the net compensation rate, and thus, the lower utility gain from holding the actual job compared to being on UI-benefits, the more intensive we expect the person to search, the larger the probability of quitting the actual job and accept to move geographically in order to get another job or the higher the chance of becoming voluntarily unemployed, see for instance Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) .
Since the individual search effort and mobility are expected to be positively related to the probability of getting a job, we expect the duration of unemployment and the probability of experiencing unemployment in a given year to be negatively related to the expected net gain.
Thus, we have that the probability of being unemployed in a given year and the duration of the unemployment spell is a positive function of the net compensation rate. We expect the same effect regarding the transition to (voluntary) non-labour market income programs.
The theoretical considerations above are based on expected reactions to short term economic incentives. An obvious criticism is that short term economic incentives are not the only motive which induce people to work. If people have a long term planning horizon, they will take into account, that leaving employment voluntarily due to dis-incentives within the year may be irrational from a long term perspective since human capital tends to depreciate during nonemployment periods. Further, in most labour markets there is some upward mobility in wages, i.e. low-wage is not a permanent state for most workers in most labour markets.
Besides these arguments, which are all based on the assumption of some sort of economic optimization behaviour, there are a number of non-economic incentives to work which may give social benefits instead of economic benefits: The job may give a social network, good colleagues, a structured day etc. For some individuals, these social and non-economic benefits may overrule the effects of economic incentives. Thus, the size of the effects of economic incentives may depend on the attitudes and social values of the individual. We examine this further in Section 7 where attitude variables are included along with economic incentives.
Further, a number of people may not be acting fully rationally, simply because they lack precise knowledge of the tax and benefit systems, and they consequently do not make these incentive calculations. Finally, a usual condition for receiving benefits is that the person is available for a job, and this is more or less strictly monitored by the employment office or other authorities.
Therefore it is not a completely free choice to react only according to economic incentives.
Data
The database is a combined panel survey-register based database. The panel consists of two waves collected by Statistics Denmark in 1993 and 1996 in connection to the regular labour force 9 The master sample is described in more details in Smith (1998) . 10 As an alternative we have experimented with using a predicted wage rate based on an estimated wage equation corrected for selectivity. The predicted wage rates are compared with the individuals' own expectations on wage rates. We prefer the information on expected wage rates based on the individuals' own expectation because these wage rates seem to be fairly reliable when compared to the predicted wage rates. Further, the predicted wage 9 surveys, collected by all EU countries 9 . Thus, the survey data contain the variables typically included in labour force surveys plus a number of extra variables, including information on fixed costs of work, attitudes towards work, and detailed information on hours of work. Beside the survey information, the data set includes information from a number of administrative registers, tax and income registers, registers on benefits, unemployment etc. In total the sample used in this study includes 4,954 individuals aged 15-68 years. The distribution on labour market categories in the two waves is shown in Table 2 . In both years, unemployed individuals has been oversampled. Thus, we use weights in the analyses which include unemployed as well as other groups. The data allow us to calculate rather precise budget constraints for all employed workers in the sample. We are not able to calculate the budget constraints for self-employed individuals because we do not have the income and tax information needed to do that. For unemployed individuals we do not have information on actual hourly wages. However, the unemployed individuals who have to be available for the labour market are asked about their own expectations concerning the wage they would get in a future job 10 . The information on the expected wage rate is used as an rates show much less variation than own expected wage rate because the explanatory power of the wage function is fairly low.
alternative to the observed actual wage rate in calculations of hypothetical budget constraints for this group. Thus, for the unemployed we calculate the disposable income if not employed and the disposable income if holding a full-time job at the expected hourly wage rate. The calculation of income taxes is based on information from the tax registers. The sample includes information on all sources of taxable income for each individual of the household. There is also information on all types of tax deductions, including deduction for expenditures on commuting to the job.
Further we are able to include actual or potential public housing subsidies for renters and child care subsidies for parents. Both type of subsidies are means-tested against family income, see OECD (1999b). We do not include child subsidies which are not means-tested against family income in Denmark.
The net compensation rate should, according to the previous section, take into account the amount of fixed costs which the person incurs if he or she is working. The sample contains information on the amount and types of fixed money costs of work to transportation and child care for individuals who are employed at the week of interview 11
. Table 3 shows the distribution of fixed monthly money costs of work in 1996 for all employed individuals. On average in 1996, all employed workers had monthly fixed costs on transportation and child care amounting to DKK 721. But there is large variation. Workers with children have -as 12 The fixed costs estimation is a simple OLS regression of the observed fixed costs of work on the following explanatory variables: Number of children in different age groups, region, and educational level. 11 expected -considerably higher average costs than workers without children, and about one third do not report any fixed costs of work. Compared to many other countries, the child care costs are low in Denmark because there is a very high coverage of publicly provided day care which is highly subsidized by the state and municipalities. For individuals who are unemployed at the week of interview, we do not have information on fixed costs of work. For this group we use predicted values of fixed costs of work based on an estimation of a fixed costs relation for the employed individuals 12 .
The sample contains information on a number of variables concerning search behaviour for employed as well as non-employed persons. The respondents are asked whether they are actively seeking for a job, and asked about their search effort with respect to time and money costs conditional on active search. Some of this information does only exist in the 1996 survey which was much more detailed than the 1993 survey with respect to information on search behaviour.
Further, the non-employed individuals in the sample are asked whether they are willing to move to another region in order to get a job and how long daily commuting time they are willing to accept in a potential future job.
In the estimations below we use the register based information on individual unemployment rates as an endogenous variable which is determined, among other things, by the economic incentives to search and work. We estimate a model of the probability of being hit by unemployment during the year. This variable is based on the unemployment insurance register (CRAM) which includes weekly information on the individual unemployment for all individuals who are insured against unemployment (about 80 per cent of the labour force). Individuals who do not have a registered unemployment rate are assumed not to be unemployed during the year. This assumption seems rather plausible, since membership of an unemployment fund in Denmark is highly subsidized by the state, and those who do not become members of an unemployment insurance fund are typically those individuals who have a negligible risk of becoming unemployed.
In the estimations we control for a number of background variables, including information on age, length of education, family background (marital state and the presence of children aged 0-2 years) and the regional unemployment rate (aggregate unemployment rate in the county concerned). In some of the estimations we add indicator variables reflecting norms and attitudes towards work in order to test whether these variables change the size and signs of the variable reflecting economic dis-incentives. The attitude variables are based on a number of survey questions about which job characteristics are evaluated to be the most attractive. The results from including the attitude variables are described in Section 7.
In the Appendix, Table A1 , mean values for the two years 1993 and 1996 are shown for the variables used in the estimations.
Unemployment traps in Denmark
The proportions of workers in the labour force, employed as well as unemployed, who were in an unemployment trap (defined by having a net compensation rate δ 1) are shown in Table 4 .
In 1993, 5.5 per cent of the male workers and 9.2 per cent of the female workers fulfilled this condition. In 1996, these figures had increased to 6.2 per cent and 13.0 per cent, respectively.
During the same period, the number of employed workers with δ 1 increased from 7 to 10 per cent, while the same figures for unemployed workers were 9 and 11 per cent, respectively. enter into an unemployment trap than men. One obvious explanation of this evidence is that the relative frequency of women is higher for values of δ just below1. . Men, 1996 Women, 1996 1993: This point is analysed further in Figures 1-2 which show the distribution of the calculated net compensation rate in 1993 and 1996. Figure 1 indicates that in both years, there is a relatively large number of observations having a net compensation rate in the interval 90-100 per cent.
Unemployed individuals on average tend to have higher net compensation rates.
Figure 1. Distribution of economic incentives, 1993 and 1996.
Note: For unemployed individuals the expected wage if getting a new job and predicted fixed costs of work are used in the calculation of δ Looking separately at men and women in 1996, Figure 2 shows not very surprisingly, since there also still exist a considerable gender wage gap in Denmark (see for instance Rosholm and Smith (1995) ) that men tend to have larger economic incentives to work than women. In 1996, 18.5 per 
Analyses of dis-incentive effects
In this section we analyse whether the economic incentives as described above seem to influence the behaviour of employed and unemployed individuals in the Danish labour market. The economic incentives are represented by the calculated value of the log of the net compensation rate, log δ, which is included in the estimations of observed search and mobility behaviour, and unemployment experience. Further, we analyse whether the there are systematic differences with respect to the net compensation rate between those individuals who stay in the labour force, and those who leave the labour force, and between those who stay employed during the period and those who stay unemployed.
The development from 1993 to 1996
Table 4 presented the surprising evidence that the proportion of employed as well as unemployed workers with δ < 1 increased from 1993 to 1996. One explanation of this evidence may be that the cyclical upturn in Denmark which reduced the overall unemployment rate from 12.4 per cent in 1993 to 8.9 per cent in 1996, seems to have brought relatively many individuals with large incentive problems into employment. If this explanation holds, these unemployed individuals might have been demand constrained instead of suffering from dis-incentive problems. Another complementary explanation might be that the different labour market reforms which have been put into force in Denmark since 1994, have strengthened the availability rules and eligibility rules, and combined with the cyclical upturn which also helped effective testing of the availability rules, this may have forced many formerly unemployed individuals into employment during the period 1993-1996. A third explanation may be that new leave schemes and an early retirement scheme -announced to be open for entry until 1996 -was introduced in 1994. These schemes were to a large extent created in order to reduce the unemployment rate either by getting unemployed people to enter the schemes or by getting employed individuals to enter the scheme in order to create a temporary -or permanent -job for an unemployed who should substitute the person on leave. The schemes have been most attractive for low skilled workers, see . Table 6 shows the proportion caught in an unemployment trap among the employed and unemployed individuals at the survey in 1993. Only individuals who answered the 1996 survey are included in the table. Looking first at men who were observed to be unemployed in 1993 and who were employed in the 1996 survey, it is found that this group of men on average had strong incentives to get the job they actually had in 1996 as only 1.7 per cent of these men were in an unemployment trap in 1993. Further, for men there is a tendency that those who have left the labour force in 1996 had a higher proportion in an unemployment trap in 1993. For women the picture is somewhat different. There is no clear tendency -as for men -that the proportion with δ>1 is higher for the group who leave the labour force between 1993 and 1996.
Thus, based on the evidence in Table 6 women do not seem to react on economic incentives to the same extent as men. This is different from the results presented in Gregg et al. (1999) who find that women in the UK seem to be more sensitive to economic incentives than men. In general, Table 6 give some support to the view that the cyclical upturn between 1993 and 1996 have pulled a relatively large group of unemployed women (but not men) with low incentives to work into employment. But the table also supports the hypothesis that those who left the labour force and most often entered into another public income support scheme as early retirement, social pension or a leave scheme had lower incentives to work than those who stayed in the labour force. However, as we shall see below, the employment state at the survey week which is the basic grouping variable in Table 6 may not tell the whole story since the survey week may not give a representative picture of the incidence of unemployment. Thus, we supplement this section with an analysis below of the individual unemployment risk during the year.
Estimation of the propensity to leave the labour market
Policy discussions in the area of "making work pay" is usually concentrating on the transitions between unemployment and employment. There is, however, also the possibility that a high net compensation rate makes it attractive to enter an income compensating programme outside the labour force. In the Danish context in the 1990s this could be a leave scheme implying a temporary exit from the labour force. Alternatively, it could be a non-reversible exit to early retirement or to a status outside the labour force without any income, i.e. being provided for by ones family. In the latter case, the high net compensation rate reflects the low wage potential and not entitlement to an income outside the labour market for this group of people. Table 7 reports the results from multinomial logit estimations of leaving the labour market to a status of voluntary exit, either as (1) a 'housewife' or in a leave scheme (parental leave, sabbatical leave or educational leave) or (2) in a voluntary (not health conditioned) early retirement scheme.
The table reveals some interesting gender differences in the propensity to leave the labour market.
The net compensation rate is significant for women, but not for men to any of the exit routes.
Having a child younger than 3 years is significant for women, reflecting primarily the option of entering a scheme for parental leave. A short education, in practice no more than elementary school education is likewise significant, but only for women. This effect might reflect women with no or little formal vocational training leaving the labour force to enter an educational leave scheme introduced at the same time as the scheme for parental leave. The leave scheme interpretation regarding women is supported by the significant coefficient for being 30 or younger. The age dummy for being 50 or older is found significant for women entering nonhealth related early retirement schemes. Finally, being single increases the probability of women remaining in the labour force. For men, the regional unemployment rate is the only variable having a significant impact on entry into a non-health related early retirement scheme. Pooled estimations on women and men, not reported in Table 7 , show that women have a significantly higher probability of entering one of the two routes to exit from the labour force.
Estimation of search intensity and unemployment
In order to get deeper into the question of whether it is mainly economic incentives or whether it is demand conditions, availability rules etc. which are more important explaining unemployment rates for different groups, we estimate different models of on-the-job search, search among unemployed, and individual unemployment experience over longer periods in this section. Since the data set used is a two wave panel, the optimal way to use the information is of course to rely on panel data estimators. However, a number of the questions concerning search behaviour were only included in the 1996 survey, thus restricting some of the analyses to only cross-section analyses for the year 1996. 
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* indicates significance at a 5% level. 1) By 'voluntary' we mean one of the early retirement schemes which are not health conditioned (overgangsydelse and efterløn). The following states are not included because we do not consider them as voluntary: Social pension, long term sickness, social welfare for individuals who are not supposed to be available for the labour market.
2) The variable is not included because the variable only assumed 1 value in the estimated relation. Table 8 , shows the key results from running a number of logit estimations of the probability that employed individuals have been actively seeking for a new job. The economic incentives are represented by the variable log δ. As discussed in Section 3, we expect a positive coefficient to this variable. 13 For the unemployed individuals we started out estimating the same model as for the employed individuals, except for the variables 'tenure' and 'temporary job' which of course is not defined for unemployed individuals. The estimations in Table 9 include a number of control variables. For space reasons we present only the results concerning the central economic variable δ. * indicates significance at a 5% level. In the estimations controls for age, education, marital state, young children, local unemployment rate are included.
When controlling for a number of background variables, the net compensation rate has a positive effect on the probability of on-the-job search. The effect is significant in both 1993 and 1996 as indicated by columns 1 and 3. However, the significance disappears if the variables 'tenure'
(which is negatively correlated with log δ) and 'temporary job' are included in the estimations.
The latter variable is only observed in 1996. As it is found in other studies, we find, that the longer tenure at the actual employer, the lower the tendency to search for a new job, and that temporarily employed workers have much higher search intensity than permanently employed workers. Long tenure implicitly reveals acceptance of the job for other motives than the purely financial ones if the compensation rate is high, i.e. the person would lose little or nothing in money terms by quitting the job. Having an announced restricted time horizon in a job obviously dominates the economic incentives. Among the control variables not shown here, the age dummies have the expected impact, i.e. significantly higher probability of on the job search when 30 years or younger, and significantly lower probability when 50 years or older. The regional unemployment rate has an expected positive impact on search on the job.
The search behaviour of unemployed individuals in 1993 and 1996 is analysed in Table 9 which shows the coefficients of the incentive variable log δ from a number of different models on search behaviour of unemployed individuals
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. The coefficient of the economic incentive variable, log δ is insignificant regarding the probability of active job search for unemployed individuals in both years. Thus, the search activity of unemployed individuals does not seem to depend on this measure of economic incentives. In estimations not shown here, we have analysed whether this result differs between men and women, but in the relatively small sample of unemployed individuals that is available we are not able to detect gender differences among unemployed individuals with respect to the probability of search. Further, we have experimented with a variable based on a survey question about 'own expectations' of the respondents with respect to the economic gains from getting a job to see if such a measure of subjective expectations has any effect on the search probability. Since simple cross tabulations show that many of the respondents are not fully aware of their actual marginal tax rates and economic gain from getting a job, it might be hypothesized that we should use such 'own-expectations' instead of the calculated actual compensation rates. However, indicator variables representing these 'own-expectation measures'
did not come out with any significant results. . Search intensity is measured by three alternative variables: Number of contacts to employers during latest month, monthly hours spent on job search, and monthly expenditures spent on job search. The variable log δ has a significantly negative effect in all three models, indicating that the larger the net compensation rate, the lower the search intensity. The respondents have also been asked about the maximum acceptable daily commuting time to a possible new job and about whether they are willing to move to another region to get a new job.
The results concerning these indicator questions are found in the last two columns of Table 9 . In an OLS estimation of the maximum acceptable commuting time, the compensation rate is found to have a significant impact in the expected direction. In contrast, the compensation rate is insignificant in a logit estimation on the "willingness to move" indicator, reflecting presumably the much higher financial and non-financial costs from moving to another region, compared with accepting a longer commuting time from ones present place of living.
Finally, the search and mobility behaviour, and the potential incentive effects are reflected in the probability of experiencing a positive unemployment rate during the year. Of course this probability is also affected by a number of other factors including individual characteristics, availability rules in the UI-system, tightness of the labour market, etc. A number of these factors are controlled for by including regional unemployment rate, marital status, the presence of young children, age and education besides the log δ variable. Table 10 shows the coefficients and marginal effects from estimation of the probability of experiencing a positive unemployment rate during the year. Contrary to the analyses based on for instance Table 6 where the labour market state at the survey week is used to classify the person, the individual unemployment rate, the duration of unemployment spells and the probability of experiencing a positive unemployment rate during the year may give a more representative view of the experience of unemployment.
The coefficient estimates and the calculated marginal effects give a clear indication that, after controlling for the background factors mentioned above, there is a significant effect from the net compensation rate on the probability of experiencing unemployment during the year. The significant effect exists for both men and women and for both of the years 1993 and 1996. The size of the coefficients may be evaluated by looking at the marginal effects which gives the marginal probability effect of increasing the independent variable by one unit. If the UI-benefits increase by 10 per cent, this would, cet. par., increase the probability of experiencing unemployment during the year by 3 per cent for men and 6 -7 per cent for women in 1996. For 1993, the effects are estimated to be slightly lower. Thus, the incentive effects from these estimations seem in accordance with the results presented earlier in the paper to be larger for women than for men. * indicates significance at a 5% level. 1) Calculated at the sample mean for the group as coefficient*P*(1-P)*δ, where coefficient is the estimated coefficient shown in line 1, P is the percentage hit by unemployment during the year, shown in line 2, and δ is the average value of the net compensation rate for the group concerned.
Attitudes towards work versus economic incentives
The analyses above have concentrated on the impact from economic variables and a number of demographic factors. The questionaire in the survey part of the data base contains a battery of questions where the purpose is to get a measure of the individual attitudes or preferences towards work. The questions were formulated with the intention of making it possible to classify workers into a few broad groups, assumed to react differently to economic incentives in a more narrow sense. The respondents are classified into three groups according to their answers to the relevant questions, i.e.
• a group where short run economic incentives are most important (A "wage earner" life style)
• a group where long run economic incentives are most important (A "career oriented" life style)
• a group where non-economic incentives are most important (A "job security" oriented lifestyle)
The questions used for classification and the specific rules being followed are desribed in Pedersen and Smith (1998) . The distribution of attitudes in the present sample is presented in Table 11 separately for women and men. (In each attitude group, the difference by gender is significant). Pedersen & Smith (1998, p. 70) We experiment with the attitude variables in two rounds of estimation. In the first of these, we introduce the attitude variables along with log δ and control variables. Short run economic incentives is the excluded category against which we measure the impact from long run economic incentives and non-economic incentives respectively. In the second round, log δ is excluded and we estimate the impact from the two included attitude variables along with controls.
The prior expectations are to find long run economic incentives to have a positive impact on measures of search intensity and labour market flexibility. Regarding the probability of being hit by unemployment, we expect a negative impact -i.e. a lower risk -from long run economic incentives being the most important aspect of having a job. The prior expectation regarding an impact from an attitude of considering non-economic incentives as most important is a negative impact on search intensity while we have no strong priors regarding the eventual impact on the individual risk of unemployment.
The significant coefficients to attitude varisbles found in the two rounds of estimations are shown in Table 12 . No significant effects were found from attitude variables on the propensity to exit the labour market temporarily or permanently through one of the routes analysed in Table 7 , on the propensity for search on the job, on the probability of active job search, on the number of contacts to employers, or on the maximum acceptable commuting time. Finally, no significant effects were found on the risk of unemployment for men in 1996.
In the first column of Table 12 , we find a significant positive impact on the number of hours spent on search from long run economic incentives in accordance with prior beliefs. Log δ has a negative coefficient. However, in contrast to Table 9 it it insignificant when the attitude variables are included. Monthly expenditures on search is the topic in the second column of Table 12 . Here we find a significant negative impact from non-economic incentives, with short run economic incentives as the excluded group. Like in Table 9 , the coefficient to log δ is insignificant.
Analysing the willingness to move to another place to get a job, both long run economic incentives and non-economic incentives are significant positive, which of course might reflect different motives for those two groups, for the first to move on in a career and for the other group motivated by fear for being stuck in an insecure position as unemployed. Regarding the impact on the risk of unemployment, we find an interesting difference between men and women. Long run economic incentives means a lower risk of unemployment for men in 1993 while noneconomic incentives implies a higher unemployment risk for women in 1996. Summing up, the results regarding the attitude variables contains a number of significant effects, but the main conclusion is that the more purely economic incentives tend to dominate regarding the risk of contributing to create unemployment traps, with attitude measures playing a minoralthough non-trivial -role. Long run economic incentives has the expected impact on search intensity and labour market flexibility, but is not significant in relation to all indicators in the present study. Regarding unemployment, male unemployment risk tends to be lower when long run economic incentives are more important while female unemployment risk is higher for those who tend to put the most value on non-economic incentives.
Conclusion
The results found in this paper indicates that large groups in the Danish labour market experience considerable problems with respect to the economic incentives to work instead of being on unemployment benefits. 5.8 per cent of the men and 12.2 per cent of the women had net compensation rates equal to or exceeding 1, indicating that the net disposable income on UIbenefits is higher than the net disposable income holding a full-time job at the actual wage rate (for employed individuals) or the expected wage rate (for unemployed individuals). Looking at the aggregate figures, the incentive problems seem to have increased for employed women while the proportion of unemployed individuals with incentive problems have decreased between 1993 and 1996. The analyses give some support to the hypothesis that the cyclical upturn and/or the labour market reforms which have strengthened availability rules during the period may have pushed or pulled individuals with low incentives into employment. However, this effect only seem to hold for women.
The estimations of search and mobility models show that economic incentives may have positive effects on on-the-job search. But the effect is highly correlated with a negative effect from tenure and the positive incentive effect may reflect that individuals with high tenure tend to have lower compensation rates. We do not find any significant incentive effect on the probability of job search of unemployed individuals. But conditional on active job search, those individuals with the highest incentives to find a job also search most intensively when measured by the time and money spend on job search and the number of contacts to potential employers. The net compensation rate is used also in attempts to explain two flexibility measures, i.e. maximum acceptable commuting time and the willingness to move to another place to get a job. The impact is significant on the maximum acceptable commuting time but insignificant regarding the other flexibility indicators. The net compensation rate has a significantly positive coefficient in the estimation of the probability of being unemployed and receiving UI-benefits during both of the years 1993 and 1996 and for both men and women. The marginal effects of the net compensation rate indicates that with respect to the risk or probability of being unemployed, the incentive effects of the net compensation rate seems to be larger for women than for men. Finally, we find a significant impact for women from the compensation rate on the propensity to leave the labour force using a voluntary exit route.
The results presented in this paper thus indicate that economic incentives do affect behaviour despite the fact that a fairly large proportion of employed persons in Denmark work even though they experience negative economic incentives to do so. We finally present some preliminary results from including job attitude measures both by themselves and along with economic variables. A number of significant effects are found. The main conclusion is, however, that the purely economic variables dominate regarding influence on the risk of being in an unemployment trap, i.e. being better off financially as unemployed compared to have a job. 
